01 17 171543Z SEP 98 PP PP UUUU AA ZYUW
FROM
:CDRAMCOM REDSTONE ARSENAL AL//AMSAM-SF-A//
TO
:AIG 8881
:AIG 9004
:AIG 9042
:AIG 7471
:AIG 12124
:USMILGP BUENOS AIRES AR//ARMY AND AF SEC//
:DEFAIR MATERIAL CANBERRA ACT AS//DAAP-AF//
:CDRUSARDSG CANBERRA ACT AS//AMXIP-AS//
:ARGENTINE AIR ATTACHE FMS WASHINGTON DC
:EGYPT AF FMS CAIRO EG//ED/MA//
:USOMC CAIRO EG//AV//
:ODC ATHENS GR//ODCSA//
:CHJUSMAG SEOUL KOR//MKAR-AV//
:ROK ARMY FMS PUSAN KOR//ALC-LSD-L//
:CDR160THSOAR FT CAMPBELL KY//AOAV-SI//
:CDRBGAD RICHMOND KY//SIOBG-GC//
:USDAO RABAT MO//AF//
:ODC THE HAGUE NL//AVIATION SAFETY//
:RNLAF MATERIAL THE HAGUE NL
:RNLAF OPERATIONS THE HAGUE NL
:CDRUSASAC NEW CUMBERLAND PA//AMSAC-SALO-UK//
:CHUSAS RIYADH SA//ASAV//
:SAO SINGAPORE SN//AVIATION SAFETY//
:ODC MADRID SP//ASM//
:SPAIN ARMY FMS MADRID SP
:AIT TAIPEI TW
:TAIWAN ARMY FMS TAIPEI TW
:CJUSMAG THAI BANGKOK TH//MAGTAR-FS//
:ROYAL THAI AF FMS BANGKOK TH//BANGSUE DEPOT//
:ROYAL THAI ARMY FMS BANGKOK TH//DUSIT ORDANCE DEPOT//
:CDRUSARDSG LONDON UK//AMXSN-UK-SE//
:ODC LONDON UK
INFO
:FAA SOUTHWEST RGN HQ FORT WORTH TX//ASW-100//
:CDRAMC ALEXANDRIA VA//AMCMR/AMCCS/AMCSM-WAA//
XMT
:
ACCT
:
TEXT
:UNCLAS
SUBJECT - AVIATION SAFETY ACTION MESSAGE, MAINTENANCE MANDATORY,
RCS CSGLD-1860(R1), ALL H-47 SERIES HELICOPTERS, REVISION TO CH-
47-98-ASAM-02, (CH-47-98-ASAM-05) (TB 1-1520-240-20-101).
NOTE - THIS IS AN AVIATION SAFETY ACTION MESSAGE ISSUED IAW AR 95-
1, CHAPTER 6, 1 SEP 97. THIS MESSAGE HAS NOT BEEN TRANSMITTED TO
UNITS SUBORDINATE TO ADDRESSEES. ADDRESSEES SHOULD IMMEDIATELY
RETRANSMIT THIS MESSAGE TO ALL SUBORDINATE UNITS, ACTIVITIES OR
ELEMENTS AFFECTED OR CONCERNED. THE RETRANSMITTAL SHALL
REFERENCE THIS MESSAGE. ACTION ADDRESSES WILL IMMEDIATELY VERIFY
THIS TRANSMISSION TO CDR, AMCOM, ATTN: AMSAM-SF-A (SOF COMPLIANCE
OFFICER).
1. PRIORITY CLASSIFICATION
A. AIRCRAFT IN USE - UPON RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE THE
CONDITION STATUS SYMBOL OF THE CITED AIRCRAFT WILL BE CHANGED TO
A CIRCLED RED //X//. THE CIRCLED RED //X// ENTRY SHALL STATE
"AIRCRAFT RESTRICTED TO FLIGHT OPERATIONS AND INSPECTION
PROCEDURES IAW ASAM CH-47-98-ASAM-05". THE CIRCLED RED //X// MAY
BE CLEARED WHEN THE INSPECTION OF PARA 8 IS COMPLETED. THE
AFFECTED AIRCRAFT SHALL BE INSPECTED AS SOON AS PRACTICAL BUT NO
LATER THAN THE TASK/INSPECTION SUSPENSE DATE. FAILURE TO COMPLY
WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THIS MESSAGE WITHIN THE TIME FRAME WILL
CAUSE THE STATUS SYMBOL TO BE UPGRADED TO A RED //X//.
B. AIRCRAFT IN DEPOT MAINTENANCE - SAME AS PARA 1A
C. AIRCRAFT UNDERGOING MAINTENANCE - SAME AS PARA 1A.
D. AIRCRAFT IN TRANSIT - SAME AS PARA 1A.
E. MAINTENANCE TRAINERS (CATEGORY A AND B) - N/A.
F. COMPONENT/PARTS IN STOCK AT ALL LEVELS (DEPOT AND
OTHERS) INCLUDING WAR RESERVES - N/A.
G. COMPONENTS/PARTS IN WORK (DEPOT LEVEL AND OTHERS) - N/A.
2. TASK/INSPECTION SUSPENSE DATE WITHIN NEXT 10 FLIGHT
HOURS/14 DAYS.
3. REPORTING COMPLIANCE SUSPENSE DATE 13 OCT 98.
4. SUMMARY OF PROBLEM -
A. FAILURE OF THE AFT LANDING GEAR DRAG LINK MAY CAUSE
MINOR AIRCRAFT DAMAGE, DEPENDING UPON FLIGHT CREW DETECTION OF
THE FAILURE AND ACTIONS TAKEN AFTER THE FAILURE IS DETECTED.
INVESTIGATIONS HAVE REVEALED THAT SIDE IMPACT LOADING FORCES MAY
CAUSE THE AFT DRAG LINK TO FAIL ON "-3" EQUIPPED AFT LANDING GEAR
ASSEMBLIES. THESE SIDE IMPACT FORCES ARE GENERATED DURING ROLL
ON LANDINGS, SLOPE OPERATIONS, REAR WHEEL TAXI OPERATIONS, AND
LANDING THE AIRCRAFT FROM A HOVER WITH A SLIGHT YAW RATE.
(1) AMCOM ISSUED TB 1-1520-240-20-80 (CH-47-96-ASAM-
01) TO INSPECT AND IDENTIFY AFT DRAG LINKS IDENTIFIED WITH EITHER
A STAMPED OR PAINTED "-3" OR "-5". THE "-3" DRAG LINK IS MADE OF
A MATERIAL WHICH IS SUSCEPTIBLE TO STRESS CORROSION CRACKING.
THE "-5" IS THE NEW CONFIGURATION AND IS MADE OF A DIFFERENT
MATERIAL WHICH IS NOT SUSCEPTIBLE TO THE SAME STRESS CORROSION
CRACKING FAILURE MODE.
(2) AMCOM ISSUED TB 1-1520-240-20-100 (CH-47-98-ASAM-
02) TO EXTEND THE OPERATIONAL LIFE TO ALLOW CONTINUED USE OF THE
"-3" AFT LANDING GEAR DRAG LINK AND RESTRICT THE AIRCRAFT FROM
CONDUCTING ROLL-ON LANDINGS IF THE "-3" DRAG LINK WAS INSTALLED.
FIELD VISITS HAVE INDICATED THAT SOME UNIT TRAINERS AND
EVALUATORS WERE NOT AWARE OF THE ROLL-ON LANDING RESTRICTION. A
SYSTEM SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT WAS PROCESSED AND CONTINUED USE OF
THE "-3" LINK, UNTIL THE "-5" REPLACEMENT LINKS ARE AVAILABLE,
WAS DETERMINED TO BE A MEDIUM RISK. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED
THAT THE ROLL-ON LANDING RESTRICTION WOULD ADVERSELY AFFECT ATM
TRAINING AND PILOT QUALIFICATIONS.
B. FOR MANPOWER/DOWNTIME AND FUNDING IMPACTS SEE PARA 12.
C. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO RESCIND THE PRACTICE
ROLL-ON LANDING RESTRICTION IMPOSED BY TB 1-1520-240-20-100 (CH-
47-98-ASAM-02). A THOROUGH REVIEW OF PAST ACCIDENTS HAS BEEN
CONDUCTED AND IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THE LIKELIHOOD OF A ROTOR
BLADE / FUSELAGE STRIKE IS IMPROBABLE IF A LANDING GEAR DRAG LINK
FAILURE OCCURS DURING A ROLL ON LANDING.
5. END ITEMS TO BE INSPECTED - ALL CH-47D, MH-47D AND MH-47E
HELICOPTERS.
6. ASSEMBLY COMPONENTS TO BE INSPECTED IAW TB 1-1520-240-20-
100 (CH-47-98-ASAM-02).
7. PARTS TO BE INSPECTED - IAW TB 1-1520-240-20-100 (CH-47-98-
ASAM-02).
8. INSPECTION PROCEDURES - CHECK THE APPROPRIATE AIRCRAFT
RECORDS FOR PRACTICE ROLL ON LANDING RESTRICTION IMPOSED BY TB 1-
1520-240-20-100 (CH-47-98-ASAM-02).
A. IF RESTRICTION IS NOT ENTERED IN THE AIRCRAFT LOGBOOK
AND THE "-5 AFT DRAG LINKS" ARE INSTALLED, THE INSPECTION IS
COMPLETE.
B. IF A RESTRICTION IS ENTERED IN THE AIRCRAFT LOGBOOK
PERFORM CORRECTIVE PROCEDURES IAW PARAGRAPH 9 AND AN INSPECTION
OF THE DRAG LINK IS REQUIRED AS FOLLOWS:
(1) PERFORM A VISUAL INSPECTION ON "-3" DRAG LINKS AT
THE DAILY, PHASE, PREFLIGHT, AND POST FLIGHT INSPECTIONS.
(2) PAY PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THE FORWARD END OF THE
DRAG LINK WHERE THE VERTICAL BOLT GOES THROUGH THE DRAG LINK. IT
IS IMPERATIVE THAT FLIGHT CREWS VISUALLY INSPECT THIS AREA ON THE
"-3" DRAG LINK DURING PREFLIGHT AND POST FLIGHT INSPECTIONS;
OLDER "-3" DRAG LINK MAY CRACK UNDER MINIMAL LOAD FORCES.
NOTE:
WHEN THE "-3" DRAG LINKS ARE REPLACED WITH
THE "-5" DRAG LINKS, THE LOGBOOK ENTRY CAN BE
CLEARED.
(3) A ONE TIME, NON DESTRUCTIVE INSPECTION OTHER THAN
VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE "-3" DRAG LINKS IS NOT RECOMMENDED,
BECAUSE THE DRAG LINK MAY EASILY BE DAMAGED DURING DISASSEMBLY
AND ONCE REASSEMBLED STRESS CORROSION CRACKING CAN OCCUR AT ANY
TIME. THEREFORE, ONLY A VISUAL EXTERNAL INSPECTION IS TO BE
PERFORMED.
9. CORRECTION PROCEDURES - IF AIRCRAFT IS RESTRICTED FROM
PRACTICE ROLL ON LANDINGS, IAW TB 1-1520-240-20-100 (CH-47-98-
ASAM-02), ANNOTATE IN THE APPROPRIATE RECORDS THE ROLL ON LANDING
RESTRICTION HAS BEEN RESCINDED IAW THIS ASAM. THE CIRCLED RED
//X// STATUS SYMBOL SHALL REMAIN IN EFFECT UNTIL THE "-5" DRAG
LINK IS INSTALLED IN ADDITION TO THE REMOVAL OF THE ROLL-ON
LANDING RESTRICTION, THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES WILL BE ADHERED TO:
A. CREW MISSION BRIEF WILL IDENTIFY ANY MISSION REQUIRING A
PLANNED ROLL-ON LANDING WITH THE "-3" LINK-EQUIPPED AIRCRAFT AS
AT A MINIMUM, A MEDIUM RISK MISSION.
B. FLIGHT CREWS WILL VISUALLY INSPECT ALL DRAG LINKS
IDENTIFIED AS A "-3" DURING DAILY INSPECTIONS, PRE-FLIGHT AND
POST-FLIGHT INSPECTIONS.
C. ENSURE THE REQUIREMENTS TO INSPECT, IDENTIFY AND MARK
ALL "-3" DRAG LINKS ARE COMPLIED WITH IAW TB 1-1520-240-20-80
(CH-47-96-ASAM-01).
D. TRAINING:
(1) CONDUCT ALL SLOPE OPERATIONS AND ROLL-ON
LANDING OPERATIONS AT THE END OF THE TRAINING PERIOD TO ALLOW
FUEL BURNED TO DECREASE THE AIRCRAFT GROSS WEIGHT WHICH WILL
REDUCE STRESSES ON THE AFT LANDING GEAR DRAG LINK.
(2) MINIMIZE THE AMOUNT OF REAR-WHEEL TAXI
OPERATIONS PERFORMED, THE SPEED AND RATE OF TURNS WHILE REAR
WHEELS ARE IN CONTACT WITH THE GROUND, AS WELL AS MINIMIZING ANY
MANEUVER THAT IMPOSES SIDE LOAD FORCES ON THE AFT LANDING GEAR.
(3) BE ADVISED THAT THE DRAG LINK MAY FAIL UNDER
NORMAL OPERATING LOADS ON "-3" EQUIPPED AIRCRAFT.
E. CREW PROCEDURES FOR A BROKEN DRAG LINK: THE CREW MAY
EXPERIENCE EITHER RIGHT OR LEFT SIDE SETTLING OF THE AFT GEAR TO
A POSITION THAT IS LOWER THAN NORMAL. THE SENSATION IS SIMILAR TO
THAT OF AN AUTOMOBILE TIRE BLOWING OUT WHILE DRIVING. IF IT IS
THE AFT RIGHT DRAG LINK THE POWER STEERING WILL NOT RESPOND
CORRECTLY. THE PILOT SHOULD CORRECT THIS CONDITION BY APPLYING
THRUST TO MINIMIZE WITHIN GROUND CONTACT MOTION WHILE MAINTAINING
THE AIRCRAFT "LIGHT" ON THE GROUND OR REPOSITIONING THE AIRCRAFT
TO A NEW AREA BY HOVER TAXI. IF REPOSITIONED BY HOVER TAXI,
AGAIN LAND AIRCRAFT. IF SETTLING IS FELT APPLY SUFFICIENT THRUST
TO MAINTAIN AIRCRAFT "LIGHT" ON THE GROUND. LOWER THE RAMP TO
LEVEL POSITION AND HAVE THE FLIGHT ENGINEER OPEN ACCESS DOOR AND
VISUALLY CONFIRM THE DRAG LINK IS BROKEN WHILE THE PILOT HOLDS
AIRCRAFT IN POSITION ON THE GROUND. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE
AFT LANDING GEAR IS STILL HELD IN PLACE BY THE UPPER DRAG LINK.
IF A LANDING GEAR DRAG LINK FAILURE HAS OCCURRED, THE GROSS
WEIGHT OF THE AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE MINIMIZED AND THE WITHIN GROUND
CONTACT MOTION OF THE AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE MINIMIZED TO GREATLY
REDUCE THE CHANCE OF GROUND RESONANCE OCCURRING. GROSS WEIGHT OF
THE AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE REDUCED TO 40,000 POUNDS OR BELOW BY
BURNING OFF FUEL OR OFF LOADING CARGO. IF TRANSPORTING
PASSENGERS, HAVE THEM EXIT THE AIRCRAFT TO A SAFE LOCATION WHEN
AIRCRAFT IS STABLE. PERFORM A HOVER LANDING WITH LANDING GEAR
SWIVELS LOCKED. ONCE DOWN, CONTINUE TO REDUCE COLLECTIVE
SMOOTHLY UNTIL REACHING GROUND DETENT POSITION. PERFORM
EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN PROCEDURES. THE AIRCRAFT WILL SETTLE AFT LEFT
OR AFT RIGHT DURING SHUTDOWN. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE DRAG
LINK FAILURE HAS TRADITIONALLY NOT BEEN DETECTED UNTIL AIRCRAFT
HAS COME TO A STOP AFTER TAXING.
F. BROKEN LANDING GEAR:
(1) THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL REPORTED INSTANCES WHERE
THE AFT LANDING GEAR ASSEMBLY HAS BEEN BROKEN AWAY FROM THE
AIRCRAFT. HOWEVER, IN THE FAILURE OF THE AFT LANDING GEAR DRAG
LINK, THE LANDING GEAR ASSEMBLY DOES NOT SEPARATE FROM THE
AIRCRAFT, BUT REMAINS ATTACHED TO THE AIRCRAFT.
NOTE:
FLIGHT CREWS AND MAINTENANCE/SUPPORT
CREWS WILL REVIEW THESE METHODS PERIODICALLY.
(2) IF AIRCRAFT EXPERIENCES A FRACTURED OR COMPLETELY
BROKEN LANDING GEAR DRAG LINK, UTILIZE THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURE
FOR LANDING AND SHUT DOWN AFTER AIRCRAFT IS POSITIONED IN AN
ADEQUATE SHUTDOWN AREA: HOVER TAXI TO A LEVEL LOCATION THAT WILL
NOT INTERFERE WITH NORMAL FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
NOTE:
THE BRAKES WILL NOT RESPOND NORMALLY SO
DURING LANDING THE AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE
POSITIONED AND HELD IN POSITION WITH THE
FLIGHT CONTROLS. SETTING PARKING BRAKE MAY
OR MAY NOT HOLD. AVOID ROLLING AS MUCH AS
POSSIBLE. REDUCE GROSS WEIGHT TO APPROXIMATELY
40,000 POUNDS BY BURNING FUEL AND OFF LOADING
CARGO. HAVE PASSENGERS EXIT AIRCRAFT AND MOVE
TO A SAFE LOCATION WHEN THE AIRCRAFT IS STABLE.
FLIGHT AND MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL SHALL USE
CAUTION WHILE AIRCRAFT IS OPERATING TO PREVENT
INJURY FROM FLYING OBJECTS AND BEING PINNED BETWEEN
THE AIRFRAME AND PALLETS.
(3) WHILE THE AIRCRAFT IS HOLDING ON THE GROUND WITH
BLADES TURNING, WITH THE PILOT MAINTAINING AIRCRAFT IN POSITION,
THE RAMP IN THE LEVEL POSITION, THE FLIGHT ENGINEER POSITIONED
OUTSIDE THE AIRCRAFT AND IN COMMUNICATION WITH PILOTS;
PLACE/STACK WOODEN PALLETS AND SEVERAL MATTRESSES (OR
EQUIVALENT) UNDER THE AIRFRAME AND INBOARD OF THE BROKEN GEAR.
THE HEIGHT OF THIS STACK-UP SHALL BE GENERALLY UP TO 0 TO 6
INCHES BELOW THE AIRFRAME. (PLACE EACH PALLET WITH THE WOODEN 2X4
OR 4X4 SUPPORTS AT 90 DEGREES TO EACH OTHER) ACTUAL SIZE OF THE
PALLETS DOES NOT MATTER AS LONG AS THEY HAVE AN APPROXIMATE 4-
FOOT BY 4 FOOT SURFACE AREA AND THEY ARE MADE WITH 2X4 OR 4X4
SUPPORTS. PALLETS ARE TO BE ADEQUATELY PADDED WITH SECURED
MATTRESSES ON THE TOP AND EDGES. HAVE MAINTENANCE CREW SLIDE
THEM UNDER THE AIRCRAFT INBOARD OF THE BROKEN LANDING GEAR,
POSITIONED TO PREVENT DAMAGE TO ANTENNAS. THE AIRCRAFT WILL
SETTLE SLIGHTLY DURING SHUT DOWN DEPENDING ON THE AMOUNT OF SPACE
THAT EXISTS BETWEEN THE MATTRESSES AND AIRFRAME (GENERALLY 0
INCHES TO 6 INCHES).
CAUTION:
ENSURE MATTRESSES AND PALLETS ARE POSITIONED
ON AND AROUND STRUCTURAL FLOOR BEAMS AND THAT
ACCESS TO THE LANDING GEAR ASSEMBLY CAN BE
ACHIEVED FOR REPAIRS AFTER SHUTDOWN. ENSURE
PALLETS ARE ADEQUATELY COVERED AND SECURED WITH
MATTRESSES TO PREVENT DAMAGE TO FLOOR BEAMS AND
AIRFRAME AND AIRCRAFT SKIN. DO NOT PLACE UNDER
FUEL PODS OR RAMP.
(4) PERFORM A HOVER LANDING WITH FLIGHT ENGINEER IN
COMMUNICATION WITH PILOT. ONCE LANDED, CONTINUE TO REDUCE
COLLECTIVE SMOOTHLY UNTIL REACHING GROUND DETENT POSITION.
PERFORM EMERGENCY SHUT DOWN PROCEDURES. IF IT IS POSSIBLE, IT IS
BETTER TO HAVE THE FLIGHT ENGINEER AND A GROUND GUIDE POSITIONED
FOR A CLEAR VIEW DURING LANDING/SHUTDOWN AND FLIGHT ENGINEER IN
COMMUNICATION WITH PILOT DURING THIS PROCEDURE.
(5) AN ALTERNATE METHOD TO USING PALLETS AND
MATTRESSES IS TO STACK FILLED SANDBAGS, APPROXIMATELY 4 FOOT BY 4
FOOT SQUARE, WITH SANDBAGS ALTERNATING DIRECTION TO PREVENT
ROLLING, LEANING OR KICK-OUT OF THE BAGS. BAGS SHOULD BE STACKED
TO WITHIN SIX INCHES OF THE AIRCRAFT'S NORMAL SITTING HEIGHT. AS
WITH THE PALLET METHOD, ENSURE THAT THE SAND BAGS ARE STACKED
INBOARD OF THE LANDING GEAR, AND THAT ADEQUATE SPACE IS LEFT FOR
REPAIR OF THE LANDING GEAR ASSEMBLY AFTER SHUT-DOWN. AS WITH THE
PALLET METHOD, ENSURE SANDBAGS ARE NOT STACKED UNDER FUEL PODS OR
THE RAMP, AND THAT THE SANDBAGS WILL BE POSITIONED UNDER FRAME
MEMBERS. WHEN USING SAND BAGS INSTEAD OF PALLETS, THE RAMP
SHOULD BE LEFT IN THE UP POSITION.
10. SUPPLY/PARTS AND DISPOSITION - N/A.
11. SPECIAL TOOLS AND FIXTURES REQUIRED - N/A.
12. APPLICATION -
A. CATEGORY OF MAINTENANCE - AVUM. AIRCRAFT DOWNTIME WILL
BE CHARGED TO AVUM.
B. ESTIMATED TIME REQUIRED - TOTAL OF 0.25 MAN-HOURS USING
1 PERSON FOR RECORDS INSPECTION.
C. ESTIMATED COST IMPACT OF STOCK FUND ITEMS TO THE FIELD -
N/A.
D. TB/MWOS TO BE APPLIED PRIOR TO THIS INSPECTION - TB 1-
1520-240-20-100.
E. PUBLICATIONS WHICH REQUIRE CHANGE AS A RESULT OF THIS
MESSAGE - N/A.
13. REFERENCE
A. TB 1-1520-240-20-80 (CH-47-96-ASAM-01).
B. TB 1-1520-240-20-100 (CH-47-98-ASAM-02)
14. RECORDING AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS -
A. REPORTING COMPLIANCE SUSPENSE DATE (AIRCRAFT) - UPON
ENTERING REQUIREMENTS OF THIS MESSAGE ON DA FORM 2408-13-1 ON ALL
SUBJECT MDS AIRCRAFT, FORWARD A PRIORITY MESSAGE, DATAFAX OR E-
MAIL TO CDR, AMCOM, ATTN: AMSAM-SF-A (SOF COMPLIANCE OFFICER),
REDSTONE ARSENAL, AL 35898-5222, IAW AR 95-1. DATAFAX NUMBER IS
DSN 897-2111 OR (256) 313-2111. E-MAIL ADDRESS IS
"SAFEADM@REDSTONE.ARMY.MIL". THE REPORT WILL CITE THIS MESSAGE
NUMBER, DATE OF ENTRY IN DA FORM 2408-13-1, THE AIRCRAFT MISSION
DESIGN SERIES AND SERIAL NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT IN NUMERICAL ORDER.
B. TASK/INSPECTION REPORTING SUSPENSE DATE (AIRCRAFT) - N/A.
C. REPORTING MESSAGE RECEIPT (SPARES) - N/A.
D. TASK/INSPECTION REPORTING SUSPENSE DATE (SPARES) - N/A.
E. THE FOLLOWING FORMS ARE APPLICABLE AND ARE TO BE
COMPLETED IAW DA PAM 738-751, 15 JUN 92 -
NOTE
ULLS-A USERS WILL USE APPLICABLE "E" FORMS.
(1) DA FORM 2408-13, AIRCRAFT STATUS INFORMATION
RECORD.
(2) DA FORM 2408-13-1, AIRCRAFT INSPECTION AND
MAINTENANCE RECORD.
(3) DA FORM 2408-15, HISTORICAL RECORD FOR AIRCRAFT.
15. WEIGHT AND BALANCE - N/A.
16. POINTS OF CONTACT -
A. TECHNICAL POINT OF CONTACT FOR THIS MESSAGE IS MR. MATT
WESSELSCHMIDT, AMSAM-AR-E-I-C-H, DSN 897-4286 OR (256) 313-4286,
DATAFAX IS DSN 897-4348 OR (256) 313-4348. E-MAIL IS
"WESSELSCHMIDT-ML@AVRDEC.REDSTONE.ARMY.MIL".
B. LOGISTICAL POINT OF CONTACT FOR THIS MESSAGE IS MR. NORM
HUSTON, SFAE-AV-CH-L, DSN 897-4289 OR (256) 313-4289. E-MAIL IS
"HUSTONN@PEOAVN.REDSTONE.ARMY.MIL". THE ALTERNATE POC IS CW5
ALLEN TRIVITT, SFAE-AV-CH-L, DSN 897-4690 OR (256) 313-4690.
DATAFAX IS DSN 897-4348 OR (256)313-4348 E-MAIL IS
"TRIVITTA@PEOAVN. REDSTONE.ARMY".MIL".
C. WHOLESALE MATERIEL POINT OF CONTACT (SPARES) IS MR.
JEFFREY MOORE, AMSAM-MMC-DLA, DSN 788-6403 OR (256) 842-6403,
DATAFAX IS DSN 645-0192. E-MAIL IS
"JLMOORE@IMMCMS3.REDSTONE.ARMY.MIL".
D. FORMS AND RECORDS POINT OF CONTACT FOR THIS MESSAGE IS
MS. ANN WALDECK, AMSAM-MMC-RE-FF, DSN 746-5564 OR (256) 876-5564,
DATAFAX IS DSN 746-4904. E-MAIL IS "WALDECK-AB@EXCHANGE1.
REDSTONE.ARMY.MIL".
E. SAFETY POINT OF CONTACT FOR THIS MESSAGE IS MR. TENG
OOI, AMSAM-SF-A, DSN 897-2094 OR (256) 313-2094, DATAFAX IS DSN
897-2111. E-MAIL IS "OOI-TG@REDSTONE.ARMY.MIL".
F. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES (FMS) RECIPIENTS REQUIRING
CLARIFICATION OF ACTION ADVISED BY THIS MESSAGE SHOULD CONTACT
CW5 JOSEPH L. WITTSTROM, SECURITY ASSISTANCE MANAGEMENT, AMSAM-
SA, DSN 897-0681 OR (256) 313-0869, EMAIL IS "WITTSTROM-JL@
REDSTONE.ARMY.MIL OR RONNIE SAMMONS, AMSAM-SA-CS-NF, DSN 897-0869
OR (256) 313-0869. DATAFAX IS DSN 897-0411. HUNTSVILLE, AL IS
GMT MINUS 6 HRS.
G. AFTER HOURS CONTACT AMCOM COMMAND OPERATIONS CENTER
(COC) DSN 897-2066/7 OR (256) 313-2066/7.